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Educating “Modern Mind” in the Light of the 
Evolution of Western Educational Thought 
Nathalie Bulle ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Erziehung zu ,modernem Denken‘ im Kontext der Entwicklung 
westlicher Bildungsgedanken«. My thesis is that liberal and progressive educa-
tion models respectively refer to dual and unitary conceptions of intellectual 
development, and that these differences account for their pedagogical antago-
nisms. I test the validity of this argument by using it to account for the evolu-
tion of Western pedagogy and the fate of liberal and progressive education. I 
introduce the dualist epistemological premises of the major educational models 
that have followed one after the other in the history of Western education. 
Then, I account for the impact of classical empiricism, and later evolutionary 
doctrines, on the discredit of liberal education and the emergence of educa-
tional progressivism. Progressive educational conceptions are rooted in a repre-
sentation of humankind developed under the influence of the Darwinian revo-
lution. They justify an adaptive model of the mind within the framework of a 
functionalist psychology. According to alternative currents of modern educa-
tional thought, the use of auxiliary means of thought marks a rupture with 
human biological development. These currents underpin a dual conception of 
human reason according to which rational or theoretical understanding is a sui 
generis dimension of thought. They offer support for a modernized version of 
liberal education. 
Keywords: Liberal education, progressive education, epistemology, intellectual 
development, curriculum. 
1.   Introduction: The Dilemma of Modern Education 
The major interpretations of educational evolution which, following the found-
ing works of Max Weber (1995 [1922]), connected types of political domina-
tion and dominant educational models, tended to emphasize the functional 
coherence between educational evolution and the democratization of social life. 
The contrast between liberal education and progressive education was usually 
explained in terms of changing sources of power in society. The present analy-
sis, while relying on such changes, highlights the problems of interpretation of 
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modern mind’s educational needs taking into account the political role of 
schooling in contemporary democratic societies. Decision-making power must 
be developed, ‘freed’, by education. However, the risk is that on the contrary it 
would be alienated by the desire of the temporary educational and political 
actors to win over and control public opinion. Educational change could then 
take an inappropriate direction regarding the fundamental values and needs it is 
supposed to serve. As Emile Durkheim (1990 [1938]) shows in his analysis of 
the evolution of educational thought in France, the educational model which 
characterizes a given period depends on interconnected epistemological and 
moral conceptions, and on the struggle to control the education of the new 
generations. This is why I intend to put into question the beliefs which pervade 
modern educational thought while examining the intellectual foundations of its 
dominant principles. 
2.    Progressive Education versus Liberal Education: 
     Outline of a Fundamental Opposition 
2.1  Ideal Types that Reveal Interpretative Systems 
Initially, I propose to characterize types of liberal and progressive education by 
digging up the features of the various forms they have had in the past, or have 
today and share in a general way, without claiming that the educational types 
described have ever been fully achieved. Ideal type portraits constituted in this 
way offer an essentially schematic representation of them, with the accent on 
one perspective in particular: The characteristics that tend to bring into opposi-
tion the educational types in question.1 These characteristics serve the exposi-
tion of my argument, according to which, beyond the varied social and cultural 
contexts that each of the educational types in question developed in, their trans-
situational differences reveal a fundamental philosophical divergence. This 
philosophical premise sheds light on the intellectual frameworks which under-
pin social actors’ reasoning and value judgments in educational matters. Thus, 
the ideal types presented are not in themselves normative systems, but they 
express profound conceptions that structure individual interpretative systems. 
The impact of such conceptions on institutions is immense. In this respect, I 
                                                             
1  The characterization of liberal educational models owes a lot to Durkheim’s deep analysis 
set out in L’Evolution pédagogique en France (Durkheim 1990 [1938]), as well as other ref-
erence works and texts on the subject (Hadot [1984]; Hirst 1974 [1965], 1974 [1967], 2005; 
Kimball, 1986; Schwab 1949). The characterization of progressive educational models is 
based on official reports, articles and works produced in the Western societies regarding 
educational policies and pedagogical principles (see Bulle 2009) and on historical analyses 
(see for instance, Cremin 1962; Krug 1964). 
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share the point of view of the American epistemologist, Filmer Northrop, 
which Durkheim’s analysis of pedagogical evolution in France illustrates par-
ticularly well. According to Northrop (1966 [1946], 216), the historical devel-
opment of social institutions cannot be understood without a clear idea of the 
“philosophical ideology” that underlies social phenomena observed at a given 
stage in the historical process. Although ideational, this dimension is founded 
on reason and destined to have, during the course of individual lives and those 
of institutions, greater or lesser forms of rational revision and transformation.  
From a first analysis, in order to specify what differentiates liberal and pro-
gressive educational models, I distinguish theoretical and empirical – or expe-
riential - forms of intellectual learning. Let us consider that thought develops 
between two poles, from natural reasoning to formal reasoning. We will see 
that each of the two main educational types that interest us here develops to-
ward one of these two poles. Liberal education is theoretically-oriented and 
progressive education is experience-oriented. The tension created by their 
opposition brings ideas of conveying knowledge, conceptual understanding, 
mental discipline, subject-structured curriculum, theoretical frameworks and 
problems into confrontation with ideas of experience, learning by doing, “situ-
ated”, “cooperative” learning, and cross-curricular problems. 
2.2   The Primacy of Reason in Liberal Education 
Liberal education in the philosophical sense is defined by its ends, the intellect 
and the development of the potential to understand − “liberal education aims at 
understanding” (Hirst 1974 [1965], 36; Schwab 1949) − opening access to 
major knowledge and the great works of humankind. Giving supreme im-
portance to the development of capacities of thought, it relies on the teaching of 
those kinds of knowledge which are deemed to be most appropriate for achiev-
ing these goals. This is so because one of its fundamental premises refers to the 
existence of a form of “harmony” or even “logical relationship” between 
knowledge and the mind (Hirst 1974 [1965], 29). Liberal education models − 
associated in the past with the teaching of liberal arts, and also scientific and 
literary humanism − link the learning of various cultural and intellectual disci-
plines to general thought development, human intrinsic values and, especially, 
concern for the idea of truth. Knowledge is not sought for its own sake but for 
its qualities in relation to cultivating the mind and enhancing moral virtues. For 
example, classical languages are valued for their propensity to develop quality 
of speech and rectitude of character; mathematics, rigor of mind and love of 
truth. In every field, comprehensive knowledge is taught because it underpins 
intelligent understanding and reflexive thought. The dominant educational 
goals aimed at rational faculties, intuitive mind and will, which liberal educa-
tional models associated with abilities, responsibilities, and the esteem of future 
social and intellectual elites.  
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Moreover, liberal education supposes an asymmetry in the relationship be-
tween the teacher and the student. The former represents an accomplished 
person, who is more advanced in mastering knowledge than the latter. The 
ideal is that the teacher should be a veritable ‘master’ who dominates his or her 
subject in order to convey its elementary structures that clarify the relationships 
between concepts and between specific areas of knowledge. Forms of liberal 
education focus on theoretical learning – firstly aiming at the progressive and 
structured development of concepts and problems – and value individual ful-
filments. 
2.3   The Primacy of Experience in Progressive Education 
The single most important document that attempts to define the view of pro-
gressive educators can be found in a publication by the Progressive Education 
Association in 1918, which lists among the principles: (1) freedom to develop 
naturally; (2) interest, the motive of all work; (3) the teacher, a guide, not a 
taskmaster; (4) scientific study of pupil development (Hayes 2006, chap. XIII). 
Educational progressivism thus touches on a natural dynamic of human devel-
opment, involving interests that are supposed to be fuelled through contact with 
the world and its activities. One of its fundamental premises supports the idea 
of continuity between nature and mind.  
In prior as in contemporary forms of progressive education – examples of 
which are mostly educational constructivism, socio-constructivism, or compe-
tence-based approaches, which may more or less overlap – the focus is on the 
individual’s capacity to resolve problems in concrete situations of life. 
Knowledge is supposed to be meaningfully linked to the specific situations of 
learning and acquired through experience, on the basis of the procedures of 
various disciplines (we speak today of “learning to learn”). Teaching focuses 
on methods, because knowledge as such is not conferred any educational value 
and acquires the status of mere resource or ‘content’, that is, information. The 
crux of the matter is the activation of its functional role. Not only are the sub-
jects of Latin, algebra, and history of literature part of an intellectual culture 
whose social function is outdated, it is also supposed that one cannot reinvest 
formal or theoretical exercises outside school. 
Progressive education assigns the teacher the role of fostering learning situa-
tions aimed at allowing students to develop their knowledge and competencies 
by resolving the concrete problems they have been set. The teacher tends to be 
in a position of symmetry in relation to the student. The ideal is that curricula 
would not be defined by discipline but by interdisciplinary problems; the func-
tion of knowledge being to offer tools for resolving such problems. Forms of 
progressive education focus on empirical learning, firstly aiming at the devel-
opment of methods and reasoning strategies, and value the social development 
of students.  
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2.4   Dual versus Unitary Conceptions of the Human Mind 
We have seen that liberal education models imply an idea of harmony between 
theoretical knowledge and the mind. This assumption can, in the first analysis, 
be associated with the metaphysical problem of dualism. Body-mind dualism 
has tended to account for specific faculties of human intellect, linked to evi-
dence of the reflexive consciousness and the logical ability of conceptual 
thought. It has established a natural relationship, implied by immaterial quali-
ties, between knowledge and the mind. Conversely, progressive models of 
education are based on the idea of continuity of the mind with nature and, more 
specifically, continuity of the development of thought from elementary and 
intuitive forms toward superior and reflexive forms. This idea not only renders 
them foreign to metaphysical dualism but also, more generally, opposes them 
to any dual conception opposes them to any dual conception of intellectual 
development – involving that the nature of the development itself changes.  
Therefore, the metaphysical question of dualism does not completely ac-
count for the differential conceptions of the nature of the mind, which underpin 
the two educational ideal types. My thesis is that liberal and progressive educa-
tion models respectively refer to dual and unitary conceptions of intellectual 
development, and that these differences account for their pedagogical antago-
nisms as described by the constituted ideal types. These premises have taken on 
a deep moral meaning that has justified the role of the educative models at 
stake in the evolution of educational thought in the West. The dual conception 
was, in an early form, centered on the human mind and rational faculties as an 
expression of the divine. The unitary conception is centered on society as shap-
ing human experience.  
I propose to test the validity of this argument by using it to account for the 
evolution of Western pedagogy and the fate of forms of liberal and progressive 
education. To begin with, I introduce the dualist epistemological premises of 
the major educational models that have followed one after the other in the 
history of Western education. I then account for the impact of classical empiri-
cism, and later evolutionary doctrines, on the discredit of liberal education and 
the emergence of educational progressivism. Progressive educational concep-
tions are rooted in a representation of humankind developed under the influ-
ence of the Darwinian revolution. I show that they justify a unitary model of 
the mind within the framework of a functionalist psychology that studies the 
organism as one whole evolving while adapting to its environment. Finally, I 
evoke alternative currents of modern educational thought, according to which 
the use of auxiliary means of thought marks a rupture with human biological 
development. These currents support, in contrast with the functionalist legacy 
of educational progressivism, a dual conception of human reason according to 
which rational or theoretical understanding involves a sui generis dimension of 
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thought. They invite us to support a modernized version of liberal education 
founded on a dual constructivism. 
3.    Western Educational Evolution and Rational Activity 
3.1  The Dualistic Conception of the Human Being and the 
Foundations of Western Education 
The major intellectual education models that succeeded one another in the 
West responded to ideals of intellectual and moral development that are driven 
by the dominant epistemology of their times. Up until the 18th century, they 
relied on a metaphysical duality existing between the mind and the natural 
world. This duality led to a subordination of human intellectual development to 
learning methods that broke away from natural or spontaneous growth, the 
latter then representing a rather passive aspect of human experience.  
In Plato’s writings, the possibility of knowledge is explained by the immate-
rial substance of the soul, similar to that of the immutable world of Ideas or 
intelligible Forms. These Forms are only imperfectly represented in that which 
is given in immediate observation, which pertains to the world of sensation, the 
world of becoming, which is perpetually changing. The goal of education, as 
defined for a would-be philosopher-king, is intellectual development – which is 
buttressed by the study of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music (Platon, 
The Republic, Book VII). The curriculum aims at preparing the student to en-
gage in dialectic, considered as the science of intelligible Forms and thus as a 
method of searching for truth, which in turn opens up access to knowledge of 
the Good. The conversion of the soul, toward which Platonic education tends, 
represents a fully active movement, freeing humankind from traditional 
knowledge, from prejudice and opinion, by his training in intellectual inquiry. 
The development of the mind, conceived of as a return of the mind toward 
itself, opens to an aptitude for reminiscence. We could interpret this today as 
preparation for the elaboration and handling of conceptual systems that are 
means of establishing logical connections between ideas.2 
                                                             
2  In the philosophical schools of Late Antiquity, teaching rested on the study of disciplines 
that served as preparatory instruction leading to philosophical studies, based, in particular, 
on exercises carried out by the student under the teacher’s direction. This askesis, a volun-
tary discipline of the mind that thrives on the principles of a science through exercise, was 
intended to create in the subject a fundamental disposition – ability, virtue (Hadot 2005 
[1984]; Hoffmann 2005). The cycle of seven liberal disciplines – associated with the medie-
val trivium (grammar, rhetoric and dialectics) and quadrivium (music, geometry, astronomy 
and arithmetics) − was only set up tardily on in the framework of Neo-Platonic philosophy. 
The seven liberal arts appear as a closed study cycle in De Ordine (book II) by Saint Augus-
tine, which was inspired by Plato’s ideas. In it, he sets out the order to be followed during 
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This was also the ideal for the training of minds that was endorsed by Chris-
tian morality. Durkheim remarks that the thinkers of Antiquity, up to the time 
of Socrates, had begun by turning their attention to the physical world. But 
Greek reflection was brought to bear first upon the world because the world 
was the location of divinity, while the human being represented profane values 
without importance in themselves. Christianity reversed this relationship. For 
Christianity, it is the mind, it is the human consciousness that is a sacred and 
incomparable thing: For the soul, the principle of our interior life, emanates 
directly from the divinity (Durkheim 1990 [1938], 322).  
From the embryonic forms of the school institution during the Carolingian 
Renaissance, to the eve of the French Revolution, pedagogy as it developed 
was infused with the aim of developing the mind. It represented a moral project 
founded on an understanding of holy texts. It was the mind that brought hu-
mankind closer to the divine, so it was still the mind-body dualism that was at 
the basis of the pedagogical models developed by Christianity. Grammar dur-
ing the Carolingian Renaissance, scholastic dialectic and the literary rhetoric of 
classical humanism aimed in the same direction: human consciousness, the 
training of thought and expression, and the development of basic powers of the 
mind.  
A lot was said, especially by John Dewey, of the links between the faulty 
ontological dualism of the human mind and body and “spectator”, receptive 
theories of knowledge. But Durkheim’s epistemological account reveals that 
this dualism legitimized the teaching of liberal arts because this teaching was 
centered on the internal and fully active intellectual role of the mind. In this 
regard, the ontological dualism cannot be associated to the knowing subjects’ 
passivity, but accounts for the particular logical and theoretical form that was 
attributed to their activity.  
3.2   Educating the Human Soul 
Durkheim explains that of the three disciplines that made up general instruction 
and constituted the trivium at the time of the Carolingian Renaissance, gram-
mar held a dominant position, above rhetoric and dialectics. Grammar repre-
sented science par excellence, because grammatical formalism was a pathway 
to the understanding of sacred texts. Scholasticism substituted dialectical for-
malism for grammatical formalism as a dominant educational ideal. This 
change represented a development in intellectual needs, as these were per-
ceived in relation to the search for truth. There was a passage from the analysis 
of the expression of thought to the analysis of its very form − that is to say, its 
logical development. This shift was motivated by the need to understand and 
                                                                                                                                
study, based on the idea of an ontological affinity between Reason and intelligible truths 
(Hadot 2005 [1984], chap. IV). 
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justify Christian teachings. And this need itself, as well as the importance at-
tached thereafter to training in logic, and most particularly in Aristotelian dia-
lectic, was linked to then-dominant epistemological conceptions. Aristotle’s 
dialectic is not intended to reach the essence of things as Plato’s does, but aims 
at their rational representation. Nature, when it was the object of study, was 
studied through books, because the knowledge about it stemmed from the 
thought of authorized authors. Aristotle’s dialectic thus opened a path to 
knowledge through the mastery of argumentation. In this regard, all the intel-
lectual activity of the Middle Ages was initially aimed at the construction of a 
science that would strengthen and explicate dogma: The pagan dialectic was no 
longer something external and foreign to moral and religious education; it was 
the preparation for these. Perhaps humankind has never had, Durkheim notes, a 
higher idea of the moral value of education (Durkheim 1990 [1938], 193).  
During the Renaissance, the desire to educate the members of a polite socie-
ty, in the eyes of which the methods of the Faculty of Arts appeared excessive-
ly rude, led to a complete and, in a sense, destructive rejection of scholastic 
methods of instruction. This evolution was still within the framework of dualist 
thought, which no longer sought the truth in the logical articulation of lan-
guage, but in a more direct rapport between the language and the soul. Accord-
ing to Erasmus, the source of truth, in important domains such as morality, 
community life and humankind’s relationship with God, precedes demonstra-
tion. It is therefore internalized in order to express an essential link between 
humankind and transcendence. Speech is its instrument, just as it is the cement 
of human communities; it is the reflection of the soul, and the means “of touch-
ing the heart and establishing a soul to soul agreement” (Chomarat 1987, 33). 
The educational model defended by Erasmus aspired to infuse intellectual and 
moral qualities, based on the arts of speaking and writing, from the study of 
classical texts. The latter were supposed to train the mind, reveal human truths 
and offer examples of healthy natural virtues. It was a matter of producing a 
literary explication, which might draw on human experience, involving style 
and forms of literary criticism. Erasmus’ model, which was based on the study 
of refined Greek and Latin civilization, answered the educational needs of the 
times. But, as Durkheim shows, classical humanism quickly became an instru-
ment for Christian education in the hands of the Jesuits who succeeded, by the 
achievement of their students, in dominating the education of young people, 
imposing their model upon universities. Instruction, upon completion of what 
was called “grammar school”, from the sixth form to the rhetoric course (11th 
grade), was devoted to “belles-lettres”, that is to say the study of ancient lan-
guages and literature, with their pagan mentality removed. Through a continu-
ous discipline of activity: versions, themes, compositions, explication of texts 
and many and varied tasks, ancient languages were thought to educate not only 
the mind, but also the will.  
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4.  Classical Empiricism and the Critics of Theoretical 
Learning 
4.1   The Rupture in Western Educational Thought 
Compared analysis of major educative models that have succeeded in the West 
under Christian influence, shows that the knowledge taught and the associated 
exercises have always been intended to increase the students’ abilities to ap-
proach the truth, to train the student’s mind in connection with the dominant 
epistemological assumptions. Teaching aimed at liberating them from external 
kinds of subjection, by participating in the profound aspects of human nature. 
This is why, on the basis of philosophical conceptions which shared dualistic 
premises, the teaching of theoretical knowledge involved the most genuine 
natural activity of the human mind. 
This leads us to pose a central question for our analysis: Why is it that now-
adays students’ activity is in conflict with academic learning – implying order-
ly frameworks of knowledge − and formal exercises? More precisely, why is 
the development of the mind, the increase in the capacity to learn and discover, 
today conceived of as a process that must rely on the student’s own experience, 
theoretical knowledge playing a secondary, informative role? According to the 
assumptions of the present research, the answer to this question involves the 
opposition between dual and unitary sources of the development of mind, in 
connection with politico-cultural changes.  
4.2  The Fall of Metaphysical Dualism 
The 18th century represented a turning point, marked by a change of approach-
es in epistemology. Any transcendent mediation between the mind and the 
world was rejected, following in the footsteps of Lockean empiricism in partic-
ular. But John Locke, while rooting knowledge in sensation, distinguished, like 
Descartes (1908 [1641]), two types of substances. The mental substance held 
the mind’s intellectual and spiritual faculties and was the source of conscious 
sensations caused by the action of material substances. His dualism led the 
English philosopher to associate an empirical theory of knowledge with a con-
ception of mental training that, in a specific sense, continued the idea of mental 
discipline inherited from classical Greece. Locke (1979 [1689], I.1.2) thought 
that “the souls of men” do not bring into the world with them any ideas but 
“inherent faculties” which could be strengthened by education. Especially, 
Locke mentioned mathematics as “a way to settle in the mind the habit of rea-
soning closely and in train” and, to that extent, as a viable alternative to scho-
lastic logic. “Men,” Locke wrote, “having got the way of reasoning which that 
study brings the mind to (…) might be able to transfer it to other parts of 
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knowledge” (Locke 1706, section 7). On theses bases, the philosopher’s re-
spected authority tended to be used for justifying practices educators deemed 
desirable – Locke was considered as the “arch representative”, if not the found-
er, of formal discipline – but this was not based on a correct interpretation of 
his writings. 3  
The Lockean theory of ideas based on associated simple ideas in fact, as 
Northrop (1946, 115-6) explains, brought an end to the dualism of substances. 
If consciousness is made up of the association of perceived qualities and their 
sequences, then it can be argued either that material substances are not neces-
sary to justify sensorial impressions and their associations, and therefore do not 
exist, or that only particular sensed qualities and their transitory associations 
exist, minds and material objects being nothing other than names for such 
associations. Hence the philosophies of George Berkeley on the one hand, and 
of David Hume on the other. Hence, also, the substitution of faculty psycholo-
gy by association psychology.  
4.3  The Fall of Liberal Education 
British empiricists, by virtue of the role given to sensory experience in the 
formation of thought, accused the mind-body dualism. The importance of these 
epistemological developments for the understanding of modern critiques of 
theoretical learning is emphasized by the historian of liberal education, Bruce 
Kimball. Kimball (1986) notes in particular that usefulness (if we do not con-
ceive of ‘useful’ in its narrow sense, meaning profit-seeking or money-making) 
became an important issue in regard to liberal education only after the empiri-
cism of Locke and, we must add, the development of association psychology 
by his successors.4 A manifestation of this change appears in the reproach to 
humanities made by the positivist philosopher Alexander Bain, in his book The 
Science of Education, published in 1879, in which he said they provoke in the 
mind the habit of servitude. Reacting to such a reproach, the education histori-
an, Gabriel Compayré, noted the reversal of thought by which liberal studies 
par excellence became a school of intellectual servitude. Compayré explained 
this turnaround by the legacy of Lockean empiricism and the rejection of any 
independence, any life of its own, of the mind, by a psychology that placed no 
intermediate between the facts of consciousness and ‘brain organs’: “Hence”, 
wrote Compayré (1886, 480), “a reduction, an inevitable lessening of the scope 
of education. There is only to let nature take its course and fill the vase that it 
itself takes care to build” (Compayré 1886, 480). 
                                                             
3  Hodge 1911; Kolesnik 1958, 92-9. The hypotheses of the faculty theory in their modern 
form, were developed by Christian Wolff (Klemm 1914). 
4  Hume (2000 [1739], 1.3.9) sees education as indoctrination: the transmission of opinions 
and notions, which are transformed into beliefs by habits of mind. 
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In contrast, beyond all the historical meanings of liberal education Kimball 
(1986) observed, which apparently led to it being distinguished from all forms 
of training to acquire special, professional, career, vocational, technical or 
mechanical skills – by the leisure time required of its students, by the breadth 
of its curriculum, by the uncoerced motives required for its study, “most of all” 
liberal education was distinguished “by its purported devotion to the mind or 
soul to the exclusion of the sensory and material world” (Kimball 1986, 587).  
The abandonment of spiritualist dualism and of fixist representations of 
truth, which were associated with pre-democratic worlds, led to found the 
modern education project on new conceptions of the sources of liberty and 
moral progress. A psychology developed that relied on Lockean empiricism, 
which held that individuals, born free from innate ideas and dispositions, was 
shaped by their environment. From then it was possible to imagine that “man’s 
institutional and intellectual life could be brought into complete harmony with 
the laws of nature” (Noble 1958, 8).  
5.  Evolutionism and Educational Progressivism 
5.1   Society as Shaping Human Experience 
An interpretation of life based on relationships between beings emerges from 
conceptions centered on the idea of evolution that dominated the 19th century − 
have they followed the path opened by biology or, in the wake of Marx and 
Engels, reversed Hegelian idealism. This interpretation, linked to what we used 
to name “historicism”, describe the element of a set as involved in an overall 
process of development. The principles that were previously thought to derive 
from specifically human characteristics, whether in morals, religion or art, 
appeared then as the results of historical processes, of a gradual transformation 
of ways of acting and thinking. With the biological model of evolution, rela-
tionships become constitutive of the nature of things in the very movement of 
adaptation of beings to their environment.  
Following these developments of scientific and philosophical thought, many 
thinkers concerned with society and history believed that the discoveries de-
rived from evolutionary doctrines could provide a scientific framework for 
solving social problems. The idea of progress of the human species that was 
associated with these doctrines ran through the entire 19th century. The social 
and moral progress that in the preceding century was expected from Reason or 
from the diffusion of the ideas of Enlightenment was now expected from pro-
gress in the social character of human beings. It was expected to come from the 
influence of circumstances, of the environment, upon action − i.e. upon the 
transformation of human nature. Human beings appeared as malleable products 
of social relationships (Mandelbaum 1971). To take up a theme dear to Au-
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guste Comte, in this movement humanity is not so much described through 
man, as man through humanity, that is, in particular, all social relationships 
taken as a whole. A major reversal of social and human ontology results from 
these representations. They involved the disappearance of the idea of human 
nature centered on rational faculties and moral virtues and justified the repre-
sentation of the world as essentially non-dualist.  
Evolutionist doctrines approached the question of human nature taking biol-
ogy as their starting point. The types of learning which once made possible the 
understanding and discussion of canonical texts no longer agreed with the 
moral education of the subject from a biological point of view. The aim of 
development, the superior ideal which animated nature, was life itself. It was 
thus the progress of life that the development of the human being had to serve 
from then on. As Henry Commager wrote:  
Morality itself was furnished, for the first time, with a scientific foundation. 
Reason and intuition had wrestled vainly with the problem of evil in a uni-
verse logically or ideally good; evolution made the problem irrelevant, for 
evil, which was now seen to be but a maladjustment to nature, was destined 
inevitably to disappear in that larger harmony which was good (Commager 
1950, 87). 
5.2  Modern Education and Formation of Democratic Character 
These ideas captured the Zeitgeist inasmuch as the image of human develop-
ment they fostered seemed to give meaning to a democratic model of the social 
bond, based on horizontal and intra-generational relationships (McDonald 
1964). The conception of the human being associated with them was linked to a 
social project. Most texts written by modern educators, more accurately identi-
fied as progressive, agreed on these aspects from the standpoint of purposes 
and goals, as well as in respect of methods. By and large, they grouped together 
around the biological model of development and its monistic naturalism, which 
in their view account for the formation of human personality as well as human 
thought (Bulle 2009). This model justified their discard of bookish learning, 
lectures, frontal teaching and explicit instruction which conveyed structures, 
notions and concepts heterogeneous to the supposed natural modes of learning. 
Theoretical knowledge, which is necessarily conveyed verbally, appeared as 
mere factual content, assimilated to information, and thus rigid, without life, 
and unsuitable for stimulating students’ engagement. Accordingly, these con-
ceptions linked notions of intellectual and moral education with the education 
of the whole individual through experience, principally conceived as practical 
and social experience.  
A “complete” life was opposed to a life of reason. “Living is the job I want 
to teach him” (Rousseau 1969 [1762]), wrote Jean-Jacques Rousseau, summing 
up in this manner his educative projects for Emile. Émile, or On Education had 
turned the Erasmus project − which exhorted educators to begin teaching chil-
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dren as early as possible − upside down (Woodward 1904); Johann Pestalozzi 
(1995 [1801]) intended not to create “schools for writing, for learning the al-
phabet and the catechism,” but “schools for men”; the school created by Robert 
Owen at New Lanark was conceived as an institution for the formation of char-
acter. The reason given for the creation of academic ‘chairs of pedagogy’ in the 
late 19th century in France was that the professors might understand the art of 
stimulating minds quite well, but still be ignorant of the art of educating young 
people’s character (Brunetière 1885, 7). For Dewey (1917, 122), culture con-
ceived of as the internal refinement of the mind was at cross-purposes with a 
socialized disposition; for Jean Piaget (1932), human moral development re-
quired, on the basis of biological reasons, that new and active educational 
methods be adopted. 
5.3  The Rise of American Progressivism 
The influence of scientific ideals, and especially of the prestige of evolutionary 
ideas, sparked off the extraordinary development of all areas of knowledge in 
the second half of the 19th century. This intellectual environment nourished the 
major progressive ideas in education − especially through the biological model 
of evolution. The early US progressive movement, which started in the 1890s 
in the United States in parallel with political progressivism, represented the 
effort undertaken at multiple levels in order to place schools at the service of 
social life, and for new generations to adapt to a society perceived as undergo-
ing a rapid transformation. For the progressive educators this meant that the 
goals of the school should be re-centered on preparing students for life, on the 
basis of psychological and sociological research results. Schools had to aban-
don the idea that academic curricula could have a universal value; on the con-
trary, these curricula appeared as obstacles to social progress (Krug 1964, chap 
12).  
Ideas of environment and experience were becoming central in curricular re-
forms: The school had to become an institution “which provides environments, 
regulates them, and directs environmental forces towards a defined and con-
scious goal” (Bagley 1905, 164). The foundation of the new curriculum was 
“the child active with work”, who needed “better modes of behavior for his 
present experiences.” It was in the generation of these better modes of behavior 
that school subjects played a part (Kilpatrick 1929 [1926], 123-4). Beyond the 
many, sometimes contradictory, forms then taken on by the different currents 
that represented the progressive trend – around the needs and interests of the 
child, questions of so-called social efficiency, vocational training, or else the 
measuring of intelligence, etc. – these currents were united in their criticism of 
teaching methods centered on the transmission of knowledge of an academic 
nature.  
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According to Lawrence Cremin, if this revolution had a beginning, it was 
with the work of Herbert Spencer.5 Conceptions with regard to education, as 
expressed by Spencer, were derived from the biological model of adaptation on 
which his system was based. They put into play capacities for learning that 
were genetically acquired and naturally developed by individuals in the process 
of interaction with their environment:  
In following the process of nature, neither individuals, nor nations ever arrive 
at the science first. (...) Children should be led to make their own investiga-
tions, and to draw their own inferences. They should be told as little as possi-
ble, and induced to discover as much as possible. Humanity has progressed 
solely by self-instruction (Spencer 1929 [1860], chap.2).  
5.4  Knowing as an Adaptive Process 
William James and Dewey only rejected the most mechanical aspects of Spen-
cer's theory of the mind – seen as a passive ability to adapt to a fixed environ-
ment – just as they rejected, in a more general way, the legacy of British empir-
icism (sensationalism) to reflect on the mediatory role of the mind regarding 
the apprehension of data from experience. But they made the basic premise of 
evolutionary theories their own, involving “the continuity of lower (less com-
plex) and higher (more complex) activities and forms” – deriving from the 
model of organic growth (Dewey 1938, 23).  
Functional psychology relies in a very general way on the idea of continuity 
between organic and intellectual developments, applying Darwin’s theory of 
natural selection to the mind:  
Darwin held that the mind of civilized man is a direct outgrowth of the animal 
mind. He maintained that from the lowest animal upward we find evidence of 
mental processes which increase in range and power, but do not change in 
kind, until we meet their most complete expressions in man (…) Indeed, at the 
present time it is undoubtedly the case that most psychologists share Darwin's 
main convictions as to the continuity of mental evolution from animal (Angell 
1909; 157, 159).6  
According to this development of ideas in psychology, the natural order em-
phasizes “function” first. Therefore it was only through a continuous recon-
struction of its modes of activity in actual experiences that the mind was sup-
posed to develop the special elements of technique necessary to the most 
perfect control of the environment (Miller 1915). James and Dewey fuelled 
these ideas with founding texts. It comes as no surprise that James was one of 
the first to experimentally bring into question the idea of mental discipline 
which still bore the mark of the mind-body dualism.7  
                                                             
5  Cremin 1962, 91; see also Egan 2004. 
6  See also, for instance, Green (2009). 
7  See James 1890, 666-7; 1912 [1904-1905], especially chap. VIII. 
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Located in the theoretical continuity of these evolutions, so-called construc-
tivist and socio-constructivist educational theories are modern forms of pro-
gressivism. This may be shown by core psychological hypotheses of educa-
tional constructivism bringing into play two fundamental principles, the 
principle of activity and the principle of adaptation (Matthews 1994, 141; Phil-
lips 2000; Tobias & Duffy 2009). The former establishes a demarcation from 
the psychology derived from classical empiricism and the latter is associated 
with mind-body continuity:  
1) Knowledge is actively constructed by the cognizing subject, not passively 
received from the environment.  
2) Cognitive development is an adaptive process that organizes one’s expe-
riential world. 
The adaptation principle leads to disconnect cognitive development and theo-
retical knowledge. The postulated continuity between nature and mind thus 
excludes that of harmony between (theoretical) knowledge and mind. These 
principles express the functionalist foundation of educational progressivism. 
Along with related views, contemporaneous “situated cognition” approaches 
and most of the inquiry-learning and problem-based learning approaches are 
based on the idea that thinking develops while the individual is confronted to 
concrete problematic situations.8 In competence-based approaches, which today 
dominate the philosophy of educational reforms in the West, intellectual devel-
opment is linked with the construction of cognitive schemes through experi-
ences supposed to generate classes of behavior that can be applied to families 
of situations.9  
The biological model of human mind’s evolution and adaptation, conceived 
as a continuous development from elementary functions to higher ones, has led 
to the separation of two things that were implicitly connected in former days: 
formal learning and the development of the power of thought. “You give sci-
ence – splendid. I busy myself with the instrument fit for acquiring it.” wrote 
Rousseau (1969 [1762]), as a precursor. This separation has pedagogical con-
sequences that can be compared to the excessively formalist trends of liberal 
education, with the difference that they manifest themselves in contrast, em-
phasizing methods of empirical learning. Cognitive development becomes a 
matter of formation to concrete practice rather than formal learning. Plasticity – 
that is to say, learning capacity – is, viewed through the prism of biology, the 
product of genetic development that has allowed the substitution of cultural 
transmission for instinct (Baldwin 1915). In this framework, culture has no 
specific developmental function and becomes the source of conformism, i.e. a 
medium of habit transfer. It is here that the drama of modern educational 
                                                             
8  See for instance Anderson, Reder & Simon 1996; Brown, Collins and Duguid 1989; Greeno, 
Smith, and Moore 1992; Hmelo-Sylver 2004; Resnick 1991; Rogoff 1990. 
9  See for instance Ainsworth 1977; Norris 1991; Perrenoud 1997; Vergnaud 1990. 
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thought takes shape, involving the complete reversal of the liberal educational 
model.  
6.   Reason, Advances in Epistemology and Modern 
Psychology 
6.1   The Relative Autonomy of Theoretical Reason 
The principle of continuity referred to earlier assumes a unitary bottom-up 
dynamic of intellectual development such that higher intellectual functions are 
constructed on the basis of lower ones, the lowest level referring to an immedi-
ate apprehension of reality. The principle of continuity leads to a subjectivist 
epistemology that is intrinsically linked to classical empiricism, involving the 
epistemological situation of an observer facing reality.10 This principle fuels the 
radical constructivist idea in education according to which, in as much as the 
observer contributes to the resulting knowledge, knowledge cannot be transmit-
ted using verbal expository methods (Meyer 2009, 332-41). 
On the other hand, the results of modern physics invite us, as far as the de-
velopment of scientific thought is concerned, to confer on ‘reason’ a place 
relatively detached from reality, and autonomous. Firstly, in its speculative 
research, reason does not aim to capture the essence of reality, but to under-
stand interconnections between observed elements. Secondly, understanding 
these interconnections is not a matter of truth as such, but of valid assumptions 
of a theoretical nature. Major perspectives of modern epistemology, including 
those offered by Emile Meyerson, Albert Einstein, Gaston Bachelard, Filmer 
Northrop, Henry Margenau and Karl Popper, teach us that the imputation of 
relationships between observed or experimented elements − if these relation-
ships are not mere habits of association – is mediatized in scientific reasoning 
                                                             
10  See Popper 1972; Matthews 1994, 150-1. An expression of these conceptions can be found 
in the works of the Russian psychologist and epistemologist Vasily Davydov. Davydov, refer-
ring to Russian manuals and textbooks most widely prevalent in the 1970’s, shows that they 
were rooted in an empirical theory of thought. Its central idea, Davydov explains, is precise-
ly that all of the content of a concept can ultimately be reduced to direct sensory data and 
to finding the appropriate sensory correlate for any abstract attribute. Its essence is by no 
means that sensation is acknowledged to be the only source of cognition - this thesis being 
the basis for any materialism - but “consists in the thesis that in the transition from sensa-
tion to thought only the subjective form and method of expressing the raw data change - 
not their content”. Therefore, the empirical theory of thought acknowledges the existence 
of a “‘man - description of things’ scheme, but not that of a ‘man - things - theoretical 
model of the connections among things’” scheme (Davydov 1990 [1972], 36-40). 
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through the intermediary of conceptual systems or models.11 The crucial point 
characterizing the scientific or theoretical concepts is that their meaning de-
pends on the system of concepts in which they are embedded. While the mean-
ing of empirical concepts ultimately refers to factors which can be immediately 
apprehended, scientific or theoretical concepts derive their meaning from and 
refer to entities and relations which exist by means of postulation rather than by 
immediate apprehension (Northrop 1957, 60). Through conceptual systems, 
thought takes interest in the interconnections between elements that have been 
perceived or experienced based on constructed theoretical models. As Einstein 
explains with regard to scientific knowledge, reason constitutes the structure of 
the system, and the role of experience is to a great extent indirect: Experimental 
data are linked to theoretical systems by deductive propositions (Einstein 
1934).  
Dewey saw that scientific knowledge was founded on theoretical constructs, 
the validity of which could only be tested indirectly by an experimental ap-
proach.12 And yet, according to him, concepts are devoid of significance unless 
they have a functional or active role implying them to be apprehended through 
the activity that is assumed to constitute them (Dewey 1891, 1938). Dewey’s 
functionalist approach entails an epistemological operationalism centered on 
the functional or operational role of concepts. It leads to the definition of all 
knowledge based on an adaptive conception, as the solution to a problem, and 
rationality in terms of inquiry (Dewey 1929, 1938). In this unifying functional 
approach, the qualitative differences that set theoretical and empirical concepts 
apart, although not ignored − especially in the case of formal knowledge, a 
formal or mathematical concept is defined as “operations that are compossible 
with respect to one another” (Dewey 1929, 162) − have no particular develop-
mental role to play. The consequence of this assimilation is the maintenance of 
the discredit of theoretical learning, which is seen as involving a reproductive 
conception of knowledge that leads to intellectual passivity and passive assimi-
lation.13 
                                                             
11  See for instance Bachelard 1951; Einstein and Infeld, 1938; Margenau, 1950; Meyerson, 
1908; Northrop, 1947; Popper 1972. 
12  See for instance Dewey 1929, 1938. 
13  These psychological aspects of Dewey’s thought shed light on his influence in educational 
matters. We can add Northrop’s (1966 [1946], 151-2) comments, which focus on epistemo-
logical issues: “Even Dewey’s lesser error was not sufficiently slight to prevent his followers 
in the departments of education and law from getting the erroneous suggestions in his 
writings and from failing to grasp his less articulate truth. What Dewey’s followers acquired 
was not his correct thesis that theory and theoretical problems are as necessary a part of 
scientific inquiry as empirical evidence and experimental methods – the theory being merely 
indirectly rather than directly and absolutely confirmed by experiment – but the erroneous 
assumption that experimentation and an appeal to what happens in practice, without guid-
ing theoretical principles, are alone what matters both in science and in life.” 
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6.2   Toward a Dual Constructivism 
The distinction in nature, previously evoked, between theoretical concepts – the 
meaning of which is defined by the links they maintain between one another − 
and empirical concepts – which refer to the perceived or experienced world, 
makes it possible to go beyond the ontological dualism of classical rationalism. 
It does not appeal to the idea of an abstract universal reason separated from the 
world. The theoretical component of knowledge does not take a categorical and 
necessary form, but a hypothetical or historical status. Because they are rela-
tively closed, theoretical systems confer their public ‘objectivity’ on concepts, 
as well as their temporary stability. However, theoretical thought is applied to 
understanding empirical reality. This is possible thanks to the relationships, 
when they exist, between theoretical concepts and concepts that refer to per-
ceived or experienced reality. These relationships linking two worlds that are 
different in nature, one theoretical and the other empirical, are named “episte-
mological correlations” by Northrop (1947) and “relationships of correspond-
ence” by Margenau (1950). These two epistemologists expressed in a particu-
larly clear way the duality of the fundamental sources of human knowledge.14 
Modern epistemology thus invites us to develop a dual constructivism or, 
we could say, a cognitive rationalism. This constructivism is not reconcilable 
with the idea that truth belongs to a plane that is superior to human existence. 
Knowledge depends on human constructs as mediators of individual thinking. 
Correspondingly, it rejects the correspondence view of truth – and the tran-
scendence of truth – and in this regard, it is a constructivism. However, this 
constructivism is based on the difference in kind between, taken to the extreme, 
theoretical and intuitive concepts to account for human knowledge. Moreover, 
it relies on two interrelated paths of concepts development, one being public, 
and the other individual. It is thus not reconcilable with any continuist or uni-
tary conception of knowledge, this is a dual constructivism. 
6.3   The Third Path of Modern Educational Thought 
The functionalist, unitary or continuous conception of the mind’s activity was 
justified in the writings of James and Dewey by arguments developed to coun-
ter metaphysical dualism. But these arguments do not touch on the alternative 
conception of the activity of the mind, which is not dualist but dual. The differ-
ences in nature that characterize theoretical and empirical concepts have psy-
chological consequences regarding the way they develop in the individual. 
These differences lie at the heart of the historical-cultural psychology of the 
                                                             
14  Northrop defines his epistemology as a “critical realism” – based on a theoretical public 
space, referring to unobservable entities, with no direct concrete reference, in epistemic 
correlation with a “radical empiricism” – for which, on the contrary, esse est percipi. 
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Russian psychologist, Lev Vygotsky. Theoretical knowledge sources mark a 
break from development of a biological nature. This break is related to the 
social dimension of human existence. Humankind has progressed solely by 
self-instruction, argued Spencer and, in this respect, he was right. But human-
kind does not play the same role in this advance as the individual. Social life 
transmits to the individuals external means of mediating their thinking, in other 
words, intellectual constructs that allow them to interpret the world. Theoretical 
concepts develop gradually from the acquisition of elementary notions to the 
understanding of more abstract constructs thanks to formal education. This 
transmission underlies a specifically human dynamic of development, which 
reinstates the idea of duality, not between two ontological planes but between 
two dimensions of thought. These conceptions are in line with evolutionary 
psychology when it situates the split with animal evolution in human recursive 
faculties – faculties allowing individuals to convey ideas that are uncorrelated 
with concrete situations, to embed them within their minds, and to think 
thoughts (Corballis 2011). 
Vygotsky allows us to conceive of how, in the human mind, the theoretical 
components of knowledge are constructed in a dynamic way through interac-
tion with intuitive forms of thought. This cognitive duality intrinsic to human 
intellectual development – linked to the idea of mediation of thought with 
auxiliary cognitive tools − reflects the essence of Vygotsky’s contribution to 
modern developmental psychology and revives the idea of logical harmony 
between knowledge and thought (Vygotsky 1978 [1930-1933], 1986 [1934]). 
The operations of theoretical thought are inextricably linked to the organization 
of the concepts to which they apply, implying a complex system of mediating 
connections and interrelationships.15 Vygotsky explains that it is also because 
they are organized into a system that theoretical concepts are conscious or 
intentional.  
This dynamic of intellectual development is in opposition to the Piagetian 
dynamic that is founded on the biological model of evolution (Piaget 1992 
[1967]) and has as its driving force for development an equilibration process of 
internal origin.16 In Piaget, the problem is the artificial separation between 
                                                             
15  It is the existence of such a system that allows inferential relationships between elements of 
thought. These inferences bind one concept to other concepts, so that the meaning of theo-
retical concepts involves the particular constellation of inferences with which it is involved. 
There are therefore some links between Vygotskian psychology and Robert Brandom’s work 
on reasoning, in which inferential (theoretical, involving articulated reasons) thinking is op-
posed to referential (empirical, representational) thinking (see Derry 2008). Brandom distin-
guishes himself from classical pragmatism by his rationalism about meaning: For him, un-
derstanding explicit statements is inseparable from mastering the inferential connections 
that are in play (Brandom 2000).  
16  In this way, Piaget applies an extrapolation of adaptation phenomena and biological equili-
bration to the laws of reason. This unitary perspective of intellectual development places 
the formation of cognitive schema (by definition, the schema of an action is the structured 
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forms, or structures, and thought content, Piaget’s work being, as Vygotsky 
notes, an extreme expression of the interest accorded to the structure of thought 
itself17. By contrast, the Russian psychologist endorses the view that human 
cognitive development is driven from the exterior. Higher level functions are 
constructed based on the use of signs and artificial instruments of thought. 
Hence the rupture between the development of elementary mental functions 
and the development of higher mental functions. The latter proceeds from a 
dialectic relationship with lower level cognitive processes.  
Jan Derry shows that the accusations that Vygotskian conceptions maintain 
the idea of an abstract reason inherited from the dualism of classical rational-
ism reveal a deep misunderstanding of Vygotky’s work (Derry 2013). A purely 
formal and general reason that endures somewhat in Kantian philosophy is in 
fact to be found in modern constructivist currents, contrary to their claims, 
through Piaget’s Kantian legacy, for instance. Derry highlights this deeper 
positioning and, to counter the accusation of dualism, points to the legacy of 
Spinoza and Hegel’s philosophies in Vygotky’s thinking: For Hegel as for 
Vygotsky, the movement of thought is not distinguished from the world of 
which it is part. I am in agreement with these points but I place emphasis on 
another dimension of Vygotsky’s theory: its convergence with certain major 
currents of modern epistemology (Bulle 2014) which, on the other hand, object 
to Hegel’s errors concerning the nature of science (Meyerson 1921, Northrop 
1947). They defend the irreducible duality of what is real and what is rational 
reflected by the irreducible duality of the empirical and theoretical concepts in 
their own work and the work of Vygotsky. Vygotsky allows us to conceive 
how, within the human mind, the theoretical components of knowledge devel-
op, in interaction with the intuitive or spontaneous forms of thought.  
A major consequence of these dual epistemological and psychological in-
sights is that learning must unfold according to the laws of the disciplines 
themselves, and in accord with the forms of their concepts. The problem mod-
ern education has then to overcome is, in each of the disciplines taught, how to 
provide the means of constructing, in the students’ thinking, “models of the 
subject of each discipline”, and give them means of “progressing in these 
‘models’” (Davydov 1990 [1972], 40). One condition, as Paul Hirst (1974 
[1967], 93) explains on this subject, for the students to be able to gradually and 
                                                                                                                                
set of characters that can be generalized by that action, that is, those allowing the same 
action to be repeated or applied to new content) at various levels and that of sensorimotor 
schemas in the same dynamic that proceeds by way of successive levels of structuration-
equilibration, the “forms” of the processes in play at a given stage becoming “content” at a 
later stage. 
17  Derry remarks that the absence of any consideration of the inferential character of concepts 
in Piagetian pedagogy and the influence of this absence on constructivism, have fostered 
the idea that an individual learner left to his or her own devices in a rich environment will 
‘create’ knowledge (see Derry 2008, 60). 
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adequately construct the network of relations between concepts underlying 
their understanding, is that concepts at stake in the historical development of 
the teaching of a discipline be true to the conceptual structure of that domain, 
or else, to its “logical grammar”18. Students develop and structure their 
knowledge with the aid of the explanations of the teacher and problem solving 
activities which enhance the mastery of this logical grammar, helping them to 
form valid links between theoretical concepts. In David Ausubel’s psychology 
of meaningful learning, the learner’s cognitive structures provide a dynamic 
framework in which new elements of knowledge are interrelated. In the ab-
sence of previous organized knowledge, rote learning substitutes for meaning-
ful learning (Ausubel, 1961a; 1961b). According to these views, theoretical or 
scientific concepts and thought entertain close and lively links. As Vygotsky 
emphasizes, it is not because the construction of scientific concepts begins with 
some verbal explanation that such explanation marks an end, quite the contrary. 
Scientific concepts are not just assimilated by the children, nor are they regis-
tered in their memory, but are born and formed thanks to the high tension of all 
of their thought. 
Figure 1:  Dual Constructivist, Adaptive/Functionalist and Classical Empiristic 
Theories of Intellectual Development 
 
T:  Conceptual Systems 
S:  Experiencing and Thinking Subject 
P:  World of Immediate Experience 
C:  Concepts 
 Dual Constructivist 
 Functionalist  Developmental Dynamics 
 Classical Empiricist 
 
                                                             
18  Some general advocacy of educational ideas which find links with these psychological and 
epistemological conceptions, are also proposed in a classical text by Philipp Phenix (Phenix 
1962). See also the more specific analysis of Liping Ma (2010), applied to the teaching of 
elementary mathematics and an interesting and an older text by Henry Crew related to the 
general teaching of physics (Crew 1900). 
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I propose to succinctly illustrate the three basic dynamics of intellectual devel-
opment and concept formation in question here – classical empiricist, function-
alist and dual constructivist − in a simple diagram. 
I distinguish in figure 1 intuitive or empirical concepts and scientific or the-
oretical concepts. The meaning of the former refers to items immediately per-
ceived or experienced; on the contrary, the meaning of the latter is gained by 
virtue of the system they form with other theoretical or scientific concepts (for 
example, in scientific thought, the concept of ‘blue’ refers to a wavelength in 
electromagnetic theory and cannot be equated to the intuitive concept ‘blue’). 
Experience elements are made “rationally tractable” – in other words, become 
experimentally significant − by links that put them into relation with intellectu-
al constructs, these links (the epistemic correlations) are represented by grey 
lines.  
7.   Conclusion 
I contended that the conflict between the notion of liberal education and the 
notion of progressive education is marked by a conflict between a dual concep-
tion and a unitary conception of the human mind’s sources of development. 
The dual conception accounts for the kind of logical harmony between 
knowledge and the mind, whereas the unitary conception accounts for the con-
tinuity between nature and mind. These conceptions were shrouded in deep 
moral implications which justified their role in the evolution of Western modes 
of intellectual education. The dual conception was centered on the human mind 
and rational faculties as an expression of the divine whereas the unitary con-
ception is centered on society as shaping human experience. With the latter, 
reason is subordinated to action, and not the reverse. It serves proximate inter-
ests and not human ideals. Progress, truth and morality take on an immanent 
signification. The evolutionist foundation of progressive thought has come to 
associate ‘the good’ of education with the general progress of society, rather 
than that of any individuals within it.  
Some important currents of developmental psychology in the 20th century, 
especially the historical-cultural psychology of Vygotsky and the psychology 
of meaningful verbal learning of Ausubel, give credit to a dual conception of 
the human mind’s sources of development. One of their premises is that hu-
mankind broke with nature since individuals developed thinking faculties based 
on artificial mediational means such as conceptual systems. On these bases, the 
meaningful interiorization of conceptual systems is supposed to have a devel-
opmental function. These currents take into account the rupture within human 
evolution marked by the constitution of a public world of knowledge, and the 
consequences of this rupture on the specific dynamics of human reason. The 
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duality of human paths of knowledge is also reflected by major developments 
of modern epistemology.  
These advances in psychology and in epistemology invite us to support a 
modernized version of liberal education, which appears to be intrinsically 
founded on the duality of human paths of knowledge. In this regard it assumes, 
contrary to progressive education models, that theoretical knowledge contrib-
utes in an essential manner to the development of the reflexive faculties of 
human thought. According to such conceptions, the gradual structuring of 
theoretical forms of thought, concurrent with a deep awareness of their rela-
tionships to reality, is the primary aim of the school. This supposes to progres-
sively, and explicitly, unveil the conceptual systems that structure knowledge, 
and to link them to empirical experience mainly through explicit teachings, 
formal exercises and, on theses bases, problem solving activities. The moderni-
zation of the idea of liberal education should also take advantage of some of the 
important contribution of progressive educational trends at the levels where it 
is coherently possible.  
Humankind has two irreducible and interrelated paths of knowledge, theo-
retical and empirical or experiential, one objective and public, coming from a 
historical-social construction, and the other one subjective and private, defined 
by the relation of the individual to the world as apprehended by him. These two 
components of human experience should be genuinely cultivated for the full 
accomplishment of human faculties.19 Students’ interests, their learning poten-
tial and creativity depend on the development of their rational or theoretical 
understanding, but they depend also on the culture of the aesthetic, poetic, and 
artistic dimension of human experience. Finally, these educational conceptions 
open the way to a new interpretation of democratic individuality. 
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